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When Intensions Do not Map Onto Extensions:
Individual Differences in Conceptualization
James A. Hampton
City University London
Alessia Passanisi
“Kore” University of Enna
Concepts are represented in the mind through knowledge of their extensions (the class of items to which
the concept applies) and intensions (features that distinguish that class of items). A common assumption
among theories of concepts is that the 2 aspects are intimately related. Hence if there is systematic
individual variation in concept representation, the variation should correlate between extensional and
intensional measures. A pair of individuals with similar extensional beliefs about a given concept should
also share similar intensional beliefs. To test this notion, exemplars (extensions) and features (intensions)
of common categories were rated for typicality and importance respectively across 2 occasions. Within-
subject consistency was greater than between-subjects consensus on each task, providing evidence for
systematic individual variation. Furthermore, the similarity structure between individuals for each task
was stable across occasions. However, across 5 samples, similarity between individuals for extensional
judgments did not map onto similarity between individuals for intensional judgments. The results
challenge the assumption common to many theories of conceptual representation that intensions deter-
mine extensions and support a hybrid view of concepts where there is a disconnection between the
conceptual resources that are used for the 2 tasks.
Keywords: prototype, concept, typicality, features, individual differences
In order to communicate successfully in everyday life, different
individuals in the same language community must represent the
meanings of words or concepts in much the same way. Indeed,
research on semantic categorization has generally found good
consensus on a range of tasks. Rosch and Mervis (1975), for
example, reported high degrees of reliability in judgments of
typicality (representativeness) of exemplars in semantic categories.
Robins were very reliably considered by U.S. students to be more
typical birds than were ostriches or penguins. Aggregated group
data for typicality, category membership, and other measures of
conceptual representation have also proved to be reliable predic-
tors of performance at the individual level in many other cognitive
tasks (Hampton, 1997; Murphy, 2002).
A high level of consensus in conceptual judgments is, however,
still compatible with the existence of systematic individual varia-
tion. Barsalou (1987) reported that while the reliability for mean
typicality ratings may be above 0.90, the average correlation
between two different individuals’ typicality judgments was a
much more modest .3 to .6. In contrast, the test–retest correlation
between judgments given by the same individual was around .8.
The fact that within-individual consistency is greater than
between-individual consensus provides strong evidence for sys-
tematic individual variation showing that different people have
different personal versions of particular concepts.
Our aim in this paper is to use this individual variation to test a
central assumption of most theories of concept representation
(Hampton, 2006; Murphy, 2002). Concepts have two aspects to
them, an extension and an intension. The extension is the category
of items (objects, actions, situations etc.) to which a term applies,
while the intension is the set of features that those items in the
extension typically share. It is almost universally assumed that for
every day concepts such as fruit or sport, people use intensional
information as a basis for classifying items in the extension. A
banana is in the extension of fruit on account of its possession of
the appropriate set of features that characterize the intension of
fruit. At the same time, the intension of fruit is the set of features
that pick out the corresponding class. Theories of concepts differ
in how the intensional information is used to categorize the items,
but they all assume an intimate connection between the two
aspects of a concept, as will be detailed here.
The assumption to be tested here is that there is an integrated
single representation of the concept, incorporating both exten-
sional and intensional aspects. If this assumption is correct then we
should find that individual variation in extensions should map onto
individual variation in intensions. That is, if two individuals are
more similar than average in their judgments of item typicality,
then they should also be more similar than average in their judg-
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ments about the relative importance of different features for de-
fining the concept.
In order to test this assumption, it is first necessary to establish
systematic individual variation for both extensional and inten-
sional measures that is stable over time and specific to particular
concepts. Once that has been established, then we can correlate
individual pairwise similarities for a given concept across the two
measures to see whether extensional and intensional variation
correspond in the expected way.
Evidence of Individual Variation in Concepts
In addition to Barsalou’s (1987) studies of typicality judgments,
there is substantial evidence for individual variation in extensions.
McCloskey and Glucksberg (1978) had students categorize lists of
exemplars in semantic categories, the lists including many border-
line and uncertain cases (see also Hampton, Aina, Andersson,
Mirza, & Parmar, 2012). The categorization task was repeated
after a period of a month, and within-individual consistency was
considerably greater than between-individual consensus. In a sim-
ilar vein, Bellezza (1984a) had people generate category exemplars
on two occasions a week apart. Within-subject consistency was
.69, while between-subjects consensus was just .44. Individual
variation in intensions has been less often studied, but Bellezza
(1984b) found that when generating definitions of categories on
two occasions within-subject consistency (.48) again exceeded
between-subjects consensus (.22).
Further evidence for variation in people’s categorization behav-
ior has been reported recently by Verheyen and Storms (2013), in
a development of the threshold model for categorization proposed
by Verheyen, Hampton, and Storms (2010). The threshold model
predicts the probability that an individual will place an item in a
category using a logistic function involving two parameters, one
reflecting the degree of membership of the item and the other the
breadth of the individual’s category. The greater the degree of
membership, and the broader an individual’s category, then the
more probable is a positive categorization. Verheyen and Storms
(2013) analyzed individual categorization patterns in eight seman-
tic categories and found that for five of the categories, an improved
fit could be obtained if participants were divided into two or more
groups, each with its own associated item parameters. Thus, each
group had a different way of ordering the items for membership
within the category. When the different orderings were related to
category features, in some cases the underlying basis for the group
differences could be seen. For example, for sports, one group
emphasized individual activities played indoors, categorizing
darts, chess, and billiards as sports around 80% of the time, but
hiking only 40% of the time. The second group showed the reverse
pattern. In another study, Zee, Storms, and Verheyen (2014)
showed that similar category exemplars (such as roller skates and
skateboards as vehicles) tend to show correlated categorization.
People tended to count either both, or neither to be vehicles (see
also Hampton, 2006).
In general, it appears then that individuals have a relatively
stable personal view of conceptual structure. For a range of mea-
sures, test-retest consistency is higher than between-individual
consensus. As a preliminary aim, we first wished to extend this
finding to another important measure of conceptual structure,
namely feature importance. Given a set of features associated with
a concept, people are able to reliably judge how central or impor-
tant they are to the meaning of a concept (Hampton, 1987; Sloman,
Love, & Ahn, 1998). For example, being evidence-based may be
considered more important to people’s concept of science than
involving laboratories, even though both are considered to be
characteristic of the concept. Based on the evidence of variability
in extensions, we expected to find corresponding evidence of
individuals also having personalized ways of judging intensions
via feature importance. This evidence should appear as greater
within-individual consistency across occasions than between-
individual consensus on a single occasion.
Mapping Extensional and Intensional Similarity
As described earlier, assuming that there is reliable individual
variation in feature importance judgments, our primary goal was to
examine the relation between individual variation in extensions
and intensions. Does individual variation in intensions map onto
individual variation in extensions? If, for example, Verheyen and
Storms (2013) had asked their participants also to rate or rank the
features of a category for their importance in defining the concept,
would they have found the same groups of individuals emerging,
with those who favored darts and billiards actually endorsing
personal skill as more important than physical exercise?
Many current theories of concept representation would predict
such a mapping between intension and extension, providing that
there is some systematic individual variation in concept represen-
tations to be mapped. For example, theories based on prototypes or
causal schemas (e.g., Hampton, 2006; Murphy, 1993; Rosch &
Mervis, 1975; Smith, Shoben & Rips, 1974; Verheyen, Hampton
& Storms, 2010) propose that categorization and judgments of
typicality are based on the degree of match between an item and a
summary representation of the intensional features of a category.
Rosch and Mervis (1975) found clear evidence that typicality is
correlated with the possession of characteristic features. Robins
and doves are typical birds because they have the physical and
behavioral features that are typical of birds, whereas ostriches and
penguins do not. Hampton (1979) established the same finding for
degrees of membership in a category. By this account typical
exemplars should have typical features, and typical features should
be possessed by typical exemplars. Thus, if stable individual
variation is found in extensions, it is expected that it should also be
seen in intensions, and the two should match up.
Other models that integrate extensional and intensional aspects
of concepts are Rogers and McClelland’s (2004) parallel distrib-
uted processing network model, and causal-explanatory schema
accounts (Murphy & Medin, 1985; Rips, 1989), where categori-
zation involves finding a concept that best explains the features of
an exemplar. In both cases, the connection between exemplar
typicality and feature centrality or importance is plain. Likewise,
essentialist accounts of concepts (Gelman, 2003; Medin & Ortony,
1989) posit that people categorize on the basis of observable
features, which are taken to indicate the presence of the essence.
Knowledge of which features are most diagnostic should affect
which exemplars are considered most typical. It is safe to say then
that the majority of theories of concepts would predict a positive
mapping between individual variability in extensions and inten-
sions.
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Two possible exceptions to this prediction can be considered.
First, there is evidence that for some concepts, such as kinship
terms and biological kinds, different features may determine cat-
egory membership as opposed to typicality (a proposal originally
made by Smith, Shoben, & Rips, 1974). In that case, it would be
possible that judgments of feature importance might reflect in-
volvement in category membership decisions rather than typical-
ity, so that variability in the two measures would not match up.
Hampton (1998) analyzed the relation between likelihood of cat-
egorization and typicality in data published by McCloskey and
Glucksberg (1978). For most categories, the relation was ex-
tremely close, such that the more typical an item was rated, the
more likely it was to be included in a category (see also Verheyen
& Storms, 2011). But biological categories contained some excep-
tions. For example, bats were moderately typical of birds, but were
very unlikely to be included in the category. Dolphins and whales
had a similar relation to the category fish. In general, however, the
close relation between the two variables has been confirmed many
times over (Hampton, Dubois, & Yeh, 2006; Verheyen, Hampton,
& Storms, 2010), so that in broad terms one would still expect to
see a match between variation in typicality judgments and varia-
tion in feature importance judgments, with the possibility of some
category-specific differences. People should be able to differenti-
ate among characteristic features such as flight or song for birds in
terms of their importance for the category, and their beliefs about
these features would be expected to be reflected in their beliefs
about the relative typicality of category members that possess
those features to differing degrees.
A second possible exception to our prediction are exemplar
models. Exemplar models for category learning (Hintzman, 1986;
Nosofsky, 1984) typically have few resources for allowing varia-
tion in feature weights (although some, such as ALCOVE [or
attention learning covering map], can learn dimensional weights
for simple artificial stimuli of low dimensionality; Kruschke,
1992). They may therefore predict no connection between typical-
ity and feature importance, simply because they do not represent
feature importance. However, as a consequence, they would be
unable to explain why people should systematically agree on
which features are more important. They might therefore predict
that consensus and stability of judgments concerning feature im-
portance differences should be much lower than those for exem-
plar typicality. In any case, exemplar models have had limited
application to concepts in semantic memory probably because
these models have been mainly developed using category learning
paradigms with highly impoverished stimulus domains and short
learning histories. A notable exception is work by Storms and
colleagues (Storms, 2004; Storms, De Boeck, & Ruts, 2000, 2001).
These authors have provided evidence that categorization in se-
mantic categories may proceed through determining similarity to
stored subcategories rather than to a featural representation of the
category itself. For example, a novel food may be categorized as a
fruit rather than a vegetable because of its greater similarity to a
particular known fruit, rather than because it possesses more
features of fruit in general. This evidence suggests that superordi-
nate categories may be represented in terms of a set of typical
subcategories at the basic level, or possibly even memories of
individual cases. The model still, however, proposes that similarity
to a subcategory is likely to be based on the semantic features that
participants typically generate when describing their concepts. As
such, it is quite consistent with the mapping between extensions
and intensions that we predict, although there may be some way to
derive a dissociation within this framework.
To summarize our theoretical position, we take it as a common
assumption of theories of concept representation in psychology
that extensional and intensional information are integrated into a
single conceptual representation. If the data should fail to support
this position, then a radically alternative theory is required in
which the two types of representation are not well integrated, such
that each is subject to independent individual variation. Such
theories have not been developed in the psychological literature on
concepts in semantic memory to date, although interestingly, there
have been recent proposals in philosophy that could fit this result.
Hybrid theories of concepts have been proposed in which proto-
types, exemplars, and causal-explanatory schemas are represented
as separate entities. Machery (2009) argued the most extreme
position that these different aspects of conceptual thinking were in
fact dissociated from each other to the point that the notion of
“concept” ceases to have any scientific interest. Others have been
more sanguine about the possibility of pluralistic or hybrid concept
representations (Dove, 2009; Rice, 2015; Weiskopf, 2009). As yet,
no new empirical evidence has been offered to support these
positions. We will leave further discussion of hybrid theories to the
final section, once the results of our studies have been presented.
The Current Studies
The procedure to be adopted in each of the studies to be reported
was as follows. A sample of students was given two tasks to
perform on each of a number of categories. One task was to judge
exemplar typicality and the second was to judge feature impor-
tance. All analyses were performed separately for each of the
categories. To test for a link between individual variation in
extension and intension, we first examined the similarity structure
between individuals for each task separately. Thus, for typicality
judgments we generated a correlation matrix for participants show-
ing the degree to which any two individuals gave a similar set of
judgments. We then did the same for feature importance judg-
ments, so that a second correlation matrix provided a picture of
how similarly any two individuals saw the relative importance of
different features. These correlation matrices will be termed “sim-
ilarity matrices” to avoid confusion with other correlations that
will be reported. By finally correlating these two similarity matri-
ces, we planned to test for the existence of systematic individual
differences in concept representation that are reflected in both
intensional and extensional measures of concepts.
The sequence of studies to be reported goes as follows. Study 1
first established the stability of individual variation for the two
tasks by measuring the similarity between individuals on each task
on two occasions a week apart and correlating the similarity
matrices. Having established that each task showed comparable
levels of stable similarity differences, the data for the two occa-
sions were pooled, and similarity matrices for the two tasks were
then correlated to test the prediction of a relation between exten-
sional and intensional representations. Study 2 provided two rep-
lications of the main findings of Study 1, using just a single point
in time, while Study 3 was a closer replication of Study 1 with
some methodological changes for greater generality. Finally a
fourth study is reported, which, although not part of the current
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project (it was conducted in the 1980s), provides a broader means
of testing the generality of the results, as it used both different
instructions and different materials.
Study 1
As described earlier, a common finding in semantic memory is
that within-subject consistency when a task is repeated after an
interval is greater than between-subjects consensus. Study 1 aimed
first to compare consistency and consensus for two tasks, an
exemplar typicality rating task and a feature importance rating
task. These will be termed the typicality and importance tasks.
Once it could be established that within-subject consistency over
time is greater than between-subjects consensus for each task, the
analyses comparing similarity matrices for the two tasks could be
performed. First, the similarity matrices for the same task across
occasions were correlated to establish whether each task showed
stable pairwise similarity variation. Then the data for each task
were pooled across occasions, and similarity matrices for the two
tasks were correlated with each other to test our main prediction of
a connection between extensional and intensional individual vari-
ation.
Method
Participants. Thirty students (27 females) at the “Kore” Uni-
versity of Enna in the Italian island of Sicily participated volun-
tarily by completing the two tasks in a classroom setting. Partic-
ipants were aged between 23 and 43 years (mean age  26.6;
SD  4.4). Twenty-seven returned for the second test, and their
data were initially retained for the analysis. After data screening
(see Results, Data Cleaning section), the final sample size was
reduced to 20.
Materials. The study was conducted in Italian. Twelve exem-
plars ranging in typicality and 12 features ranging in importance
were selected for six different categories from the norms provided
in Verheyen and Storms (2013) and De Deyne et al. (2008). They
were insects, sports, fish, tools, science, and vegetables. All six
had also been used in Verheyen and Storms (2013) and were
originally created by Hampton et al. (2006). Lists are provided in
Appendix A. For typicality, in order to anchor the two ends with
clear examples, and to provide a check on participant engagement
with the task, a highly typical exemplar, and a clear nonmember
were included as fillers. For importance, it was not deemed nec-
essary to include anchors and 12 features were sampled at random
from the 29 to 39 features listed in the norms. The two anchors for
typicality were treated as fillers and were removed from the data
prior to analysis. (In Study 3, which was a partial replication of this
study, the anchor point items for typicality were incorporated in
the analysis, and the list was reduced to 12 items for comparability
with importance by removing two other items. Apart from a raised
degree of consistency and consensus for typicality, the results were
essentially the same).
In selecting the exemplars and features to use, there were two
important criteria. On the one hand, the features needed to predict
typicality and category membership of exemplars at a group level,
as demonstrated in earlier research on prototypes (Hampton, 1979;
Rosch & Mervis, 1975). On the other hand, the features and
exemplars needed to be sensitive to possible individual differences
in concept representation, which means that exemplars were de-
liberately chosen to have a restricted range of moderate typicality,
and features to have moderate importance to the concept. In order
to demonstrate that the features were nonetheless predictive of
typicality (and therefore good candidates for showing up individ-
ual variation in concept representations), an analysis is reported
after the first three studies have been presented. The analysis
shows that while possession of the features correlated with typi-
cality in our restricted sample of 12 exemplars at a variable level
across the categories used (.14  r  .92), when correlated with
typicality for a larger more representative sample of exemplars, the
correlation was uniformly high (.63  r  .94, M  .80) and
comparable with the population of features from which they were
sampled (.72  r  .88, M  .82). The features used were
therefore a representative sample of the intensions of the concepts.
Design and procedure. Both tasks were based on a scale from
1 (not typical, not important) to 7 (highly typical, highly impor-
tant). Each task was presented category by category, with the 12
(or 14) items listed within each category in alphabetical order. Half
the participants did the typicality task first followed by the impor-
tance task, and half the reverse. Two weeks after the first testing
session, participants repeated the same tests. The second testing
occasion reversed the order in which the tasks were done, and the
items within each category were ordered in reverse alphabetic
order.
Instructions. Instructions for the tasks were based on earlier
research (e.g., Hampton, 1987; Hampton & Gardiner, 1983). They
included examples of ratings for a different category, not used in
the main task. They were as follows (the original was in Italian):
Typicality of membership: In this booklet, you will find six
category names, and under each one a list of words. Please
give us a judgment of how representative or typical you think
each word is of that category. Use a 7 to indicate something
that is highly typical of the category, down to 1 for something
that is unrelated to the category. Use the numbers in between
for different degrees of typicality.
Examples of items and possible ratings were then given for the
category “furniture,” to illustrate how the judgment should be
made.
Importance of features: In this booklet, you will see six
category names, and under each name a list of features that
describe things that might be in that category. We want you
to tell us how important you think each feature is for deciding
whether something is in the category. Use 1 to indicate that
some feature is completely unimportant, and numbers up to 7
to indicate that something is very important.
As for typicality, the instructions were supplemented by exam-
ples of features of “furniture” and possible ratings that they might
be given and why.
Results
Ratings of item typicality and feature importance for each of the
two testing occasions were tabulated for each category. End an-
chors were removed for typicality, so that both scales were based
on 12 items per category. A small number of ratings (less than 1%)
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were left blank by participants and were replaced with the mean
for the item. The data were analyzed category by category, so that
with 6 categories and two tasks each administered on two occa-
sions, there was a total of 6  2  2  24 datasets each consisting
of a matrix of ratings from 27 participants for 12 items.
Data cleaning. For the purposes of considering the similarity
between participants, it was particularly important to ensure that all
participants engaged with the task and responded independently of
each other, otherwise the similarity data would likely contain artifac-
tual effects. A participant who was not attending to the tasks would
end up being dissimilar from the other participants on both tasks and
hence contribute to a positive correlation of the similarity matrices.
Alternatively if participants had been checking each other’s re-
sponses, they would end up as a similar pair on both tasks, and
likewise contribute to a positive correlation of similarities.
First, to check understanding and engagement, for each of the 24
datasets, the ratings of each participant were correlated with the
average of the remainder of the group. Those with systematically poor
engagement were defined as those having a correlation with the group
of less than 0.2 for more than four of the 12 tests for a given task. Two
participants were excluded based on this criterion, one for typicality
and one for importance. Second, to test for independence, each of the
24 datasets were screened for “very high” correlations between indi-
viduals defined as r being greater than 0.95. Five participants with a
large number of very high correlations (20 or more each across the 24
datasets) were excluded on the basis that we suspected some collusion
between them in the classroom setting. For example one pair of
participants taking the first typicality task across the six categories had
one correlation of .98, three of .99, and one of 1.00. For a 7-point
rating task across 12 items in each case, with mean agreement be-
tween individuals of around 0.4, this level of agreement is clearly
“unexpected.” The experimenter running the study (A. P.) on recalling
the occasion reported that the possibility of collusion could not be
ruled out, in spite of her presence in the room. Given the clear
evidence of extreme nonindependence in the data we chose to exclude
the participants concerned.1
Reliability. To validate our two measures, we wanted first to
show that they constituted reliable scales. We expected that aver-
age ratings of typicality and importance should show reliable
differences between items or features, indicating that the tasks
were meaningful for participants and tapped into the same com-
mon representations (prior to looking for individual differences
within these). Reliabilities for typicality and importance on each
occasion were calculated. For typicality, across the six categories
and two occasions, Cronbach’s alpha was between .89 and .96,
with the exception of science which had values of .69 and .49 for
the first and second test, respectively. Inspection revealed that this
exception was the result of most exemplars receiving high typi-
cality ratings, leading to lower variance and lower reliability. For
importance, reliabilities were comparably high (.88 to .95) for all
categories except this time for insects, which had alphas of .72 and
.68 on the two occasions, again because of lower variance in the
mean ratings. In general then, ratings were reliable (alpha around
.9), except for science for typicality and insects for importance.
(Recall that our rationale for selecting materials which would
reflect individual differences meant that there could be restricted
variance within our samples, leading to lower reliability.)
Within-subject consistency and between-subject consensus.
The first aim was to replicate the earlier finding that within-subject
consistency across occasions was greater than consensus between
participants for typicality, and to discover whether the same pat-
tern was true for importance. The columns headed “Within-subject
consistency” of Table 1 show the mean and standard deviation for
the within-subject correlations between the first and second test for
each category averaged across participants. Typicality is shown on
the left and importance on the right. Overall average within-subject
consistency was 0.62, 95% confidence interval (CI) [.50, .74] for
typicality and 0.60, 95% CI [.48, .72] for importance. Between-
subjects consensus was calculated within the first and second
sessions separately, and then averaged, and the results are shown
in Table 1 in the columns headed “Between-subject consensus.”
Values were lower than those for within-subject consistency in
every case, with a mean of .37 (95% CI [.21, .53]) for typicality
and .32 (95% CI [.19, .45]) for importance.
The first analysis therefore confirmed the presence of systematic
individual responding for both typicality and importance tasks, and
to a very similar degree in each task and for each category. Across
2 weeks, correlations between ratings for the same individual were
around 0.6, whereas correlations between different individuals in
the same testing session averaged around 0.35. The lower reliabili-
ties noted above for typicality for the science category, and for
importance for the insects category are reflected in Table 1, where
both within- and between-subjects correlations were noticeably
lower than for the other categories.
Similarity matrices. The second (and principal) aim of Study
1 was to test whether individual variation seen in the typicality task
could be mapped on to that seen in the importance task, using the
correlation between individuals as a measure of their similarity.
Each of the six categories was analyzed independently as follows.
Four 20  20 participant similarity matrices were computed based
on the correlation between participants, one for each of the two
1 Based on an estimated correlation of 0.5 between individuals across the
12 ratings, and using Fisher’s Z transform, a correlation of 0.95 represents
approximately 4 SD above the mean, with an expected frequency of 3.2 per
10,000 correlations, or about 2.3 in the full dataset of 25  12  24 
7,200 correlations. Our finding of stable similarity structure means that the
correlations are not however randomly distributed, so one may expect more
than this rate of high correlations in the sampled data. Figure 1 shows the
observed distribution of pairwise correlations aggregated across all tasks.
Table 1
Correlation Between First and Second Occasions as a Measure
of Within-Subject Consistency and Average Correlation Between
Participants Averaged Across Occasions for Between-Subject
Consensus, Study 1
Typicality Importance
Category
Within-
subject
consistency
Between-
subject
consensus
Within-
subject
consistency
Between-
subject
consensus
Insects .57 (.25) .33 (.30) .41 (.32) .10 (.32)
Sports .69 (.24) .47 (.27) .52 (.37) .36 (.30)
Fish .64 (.25) .35 (.28) .67 (.32) .30 (.33)
Tools .68 (.24) .46 (.24) .58 (.27) .32 (.32)
Science .42 (.38) .11 (.35) .69 (.28) .50 (.25)
Vegetables .70 (.24) .53 (.24) .70 (.17) .36 (.28)
M (SD) .62 (.27) .37 (.28) .60 (.29) .32 (.30)
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tasks on each of the two occasions. Each of the resulting 24
similarity matrices thus showed the similarity between all pairs of
participants in their ratings for that particular task, category and
testing occasion. Each square matrix was reduced to a triangular
table showing the (20  19) / 2  190 unique correlations between
pairs of participants.
As a check on the statistical features of the data, before corre-
lating the similarity matrices the distribution of similarities (the
person-person correlations within each matrix) was plotted, and is
included in Figure 1 for typicality and importance separately.
(Figure 1, in fact, shows pooled data from Studies 1 through 3.)
The distributions were quasinormal with a similar degree of neg-
ative skew (.47) in each case. Because a positive correlation was
predicted between similarities for the two tasks, the matching
direction and degree of skew means that skew would not restrict
the degree of positive correlation achievable. Fisher’s Z transform
applied to the same set of correlations produced a distribution that
replaced the negative skew with a slightly stronger positive one,
but which was also quite strongly leptokurtic. We therefore pro-
ceeded with the analysis of similarities based on untransformed
correlations.
First, to discover whether there were stable similarities and
differences between individuals in their judgments, the 12 simi-
larity matrices (2 tasks  6 categories) from session one were
correlated with their equivalents from session two, and the results
are shown in the columns of Table 2 headed “Typicality–
typicality” and “Importance–importance” with subheadings
“Within-category.” All 12 correlations were significantly greater
than zero on a one-sample t test with df  189, with a mean of .28
for typicality and .33 for importance. One-sample t tests across the
six categories also showed that both means were clearly greater
than zero, t(5)  8.0, p  .0001.2
From Table 2, we can conclude that there were stable and
systematic similarities and differences between individuals, be-
cause on each task the similarity between participants on the first
occasion could be used to predict their similarity on the second
occasion. (Note that as before, typicality for science and impor-
tance for insects had rather lower values, owing to a restricted
variance in the original ratings.)
Having established that there were reliable and systematic sim-
ilarities and differences on each of the tasks considered separately,
it then remained to compare the degree of similarity of any two
individuals on one task with their degree of similarity on the other.
For maximum power, the typicality ratings from the two sessions
for each participant were averaged, as were the importance ratings.
Similarity matrices between participants were then recalculated
based on these combined ratings, one for typicality and one for
importance, for each of the six categories separately. The typicality
and importance similarity matrices were then correlated and the
results are shown in the column of Table 2 headed “Typicality–
importance” with subheading “Within-category.” It is clear from
the Table that the correlations of similarities across the two tasks
were considerably lower (M  0.07) than those across sessions for
the same task (.28 and .33). However, the mean was still signifi-
cantly greater than zero on a one-tailed one-sample t test across the
categories, t(5)  2.12, p  .05 one-tailed, and two of the corre-
lations were individually significantly greater than zero. So there
was apparently some, albeit very weak, evidence for a correspon-
dence between similarity structures for the two tasks.
Testing for category specificity. The results presented thus
far showed substantial systematic individual variation on each of
the two tasks (typicality and importance) as seen in the correlation
of similarity matrices across occasions. Although weaker, there
was also evidence for a significant relation between the two tasks,
as seen in the significant positive correlation between the similar-
ity matrices based on the typicality and importance judgments for
at least two of the six categories.
However, further exploratory analysis of the data undermined
this conclusion. In correlating the different matrices, we also
generated a set of correlations looking at how similarity in ratings
for one particular category correlated with those for other catego-
ries. Prima facie, there is no reason why, for example, the simi-
larity of people’s typicality ratings for fish should correlate with
the similarity of their typicality ratings for sports. Surprisingly,
these correlations, although small, were generally positive, and in
some cases of comparable size to the correlations between tasks
reported above. Reasons for these positive correlations may in-
clude different levels of motivation, or different ways in which the
task instructions were interpreted. Participants with low motivation
may respond more randomly and therefore have lower similarity to
other participants on all category measures. Alternatively a group
of participants who focus on one interpretation of the task (e.g.,
basing typicality on frequency rather than family resemblance)
will show greater within-group similarity across all categories for
that task.3 In effect, showing that similarity structure is stable over
time can only be taken as evidence for variation in actual concep-
tual contents, rather than more general factors, if the similarity is
specific to a given category.
We therefore needed to institute a further control to test that the
correlations between similarity matrices that we are concerned
with were greater than the general background level of positive
correlation seen between different categories. To implement this,
within-category correlations were compared to between-category
correlations for each of the measures. Results are shown in the
“Between-category” columns of Table 2 for (a) the consistency of
typicality similarity matrices across sessions (typicality–
typicality), (b) the consistency of importance similarity matrices
across sessions (importance–importance), and (c) the correlation
between the similarity matrices for typicality and importance
based on ratings averaged across sessions (typicality–importance).
Independent t tests comparing the six within and 30 between
category correlations for each measure, and using Fisher’s Z trans-
form showed significant differences for typicality–typicality,
t(34)  4.28, p  .001, for importance–importance, t(34)  4.25,
p  .001, and none for typicality–importance, t(34)  0.38.
To summarize, the similarity matrices for the same task across
occasions correlated significantly higher within than between cat-
egories. However the correlation of similarity matrices obtained
from the two different tasks (.07) was no higher than expected
from the baseline level of correlation observed across different
categories (.09).
2 Estimates of significance levels for correlations between similarity
matrices should be treated with some caution given the lack of indepen-
dence within the similarity matrices. Using the Fisher Z transform, and
assuming n  190, the estimated 95% CI for a correlation of .30 would
correspond to the range r  .15 to .42.
3 We thank Bob Rehder for this suggestion.
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Our conclusion must therefore be altered. There were significant
systematic similarities and differences between individuals in how
they rated typicality of exemplars and importance of features, but
there was no evidence that these similarities and differences cor-
responded between the two tasks.
The effect of data cleaning. A final check was run to test
whether exclusion of the five participants with suspiciously high
intercorrelations had an effect on the conclusions drawn. When all
25 participants were analyzed in the same manner (rather than the
20 selected earlier), the correlation between similarity structures
for the two tasks within-categories did indeed increase, from .07 to
.15. However so did the correlation between categories, from .09 to
.17. Obviously, having one or more pairs of participants whose
ratings on all tasks were much closer than expected increased the
correlation of similarity matrices across the tasks. However, it did
so in an indiscriminate way. In terms of consistency and consen-
sus, including all 25 participants raised consensus to .39 and
reduced consistency to .61.
Discussion
The finding that there was no relationship between the system-
atic individual differences in typicality ratings and those in impor-
tance ratings is a challenge to theories of conceptual representa-
tion. Before discussing the implications, further studies were
conducted to look for evidence that the relationship might be
present, and to guard against a Type II error. Study 2 involved two
samples of 30 students each, who did each task just once with the
tasks separated by a period of 2 weeks. The aim was to remove any
possible interference from doing both tasks in the same testing
session, and to provide two replications of the test for the relation
of similarity between intension and extension. Study 3 was broadly
a replication of Study 1 using rankings rather than ratings and a
slightly different selection of exemplars. Finally Study 4 reports
some data from an earlier unpublished project with a number of
important differences in method and with new materials.
Study 2
Having established that similarity matrices for typicality and
importance judgments are reasonably stable, correlating across
occasions at around 0.3, the second study omitted the repeated
testing element. Study 1 had participants make both ratings in the
same session which raises the possibility that there would be some
form of priming or interference taking place from one task to the
other. Instead, for Study 2, each participant judged typicality and
importance just once for each category. Half the participants did
the typicality judgments on the first occasion, and importance on
the second, and half did the reverse. The aim was again to see
whether similarity between individuals on one task would map
onto similarity on the other task.
Method
Participants. Two samples of participants at the “Kore” Uni-
versity of Enna were run in a replication design. Thirty students
(29 females) aged between 22 and 43 years (M  25.3; SD  4.4)
took part in Study 2A. Study 2B involved 30 participants (23
females) aged between 21 and 41 years (M  26.3; SD  4.7) of
whom one did not complete the task.
Materials. The materials used were the same as in Study 1.
Design and procedure. Participants were divided on Week 1
into two groups of 15. One group did the typicality task on Week
1, and the importance task on Week 2. The other group did the
reverse. The instructions were the same as in Study 1.
Results: Study 2A
Data cleaning. A small number (less than 1%) of responses
were left blank, and were replaced by the mean for the item. Data
were tabulated for each task and each category separately. Reli-
ability of individual participants’ ratings (alpha) ranged from .8
(insects) to .97 for importance, with five of six categories above .9,
Figure 1. Distribution of correlations in the similarity matrices for the typicality and importance tasks across
Studies 1 to 3. See the online article for the color version of this figure.
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while for typicality, alpha was uniformly high (.94). As in Study
1, the features for insects showed slightly lower reliability. No
participants needed to be excluded on the basis of low individual-
group correlations.
A second data cleaning analysis looked for the occurrence of
very high correlations between participants, indicating that their
responses were possibly not independent. For importance, there
were only three out of 2,610 correlations over 0.95, but for
typicality, there was an excess of high correlations for one partic-
ipant who was excluded from the analysis. After this exclusion,
there were just two high correlations in the set. The analysis was
therefore performed on the remaining 29 participants.4
Analysis of similarity. Because Study 2 only involved a sin-
gle task on each occasion, just 12 similarity matrices were pro-
duced, one for each task for each of the six categories. There was
a small but statistically significant background level of positive
cross-category correlation for importance (mean r  .10), t(15) 
4.50, p  .001, but not for typicality (mean r  .01). Because of
this general background level of positive correlation between
similarities measured for different categories, to test for a corre-
lation between the similarity matrices for the two tasks, we went
directly to the comparison of within-category and between-
category correlations. Table 3 shows the correlation between the
similarity matrices for typicality and for importance, calculated
within the same category (within-category) or between different
categories (between-category). The results for Study 2A are shown
on the left side. Any degree of correspondence in individual
differences for the two tasks should show up in greater levels of
correlation within the same category than between different cate-
gories.
The first two columns of data in Table 3 show the correlations
between similarity matrices for typicality and importance within
each category and between categories. The six within-category
correlations had almost the same mean (0.05) as the 30 between-
category correlations (0.04), and both were close to zero. There
was therefore no evidence for similarity between individuals on
one task mapping onto similarity between individuals on the other
task.
As a check, the analysis was also performed on the full sample
of 30 participants. For the critical typicality–importance correla-
tion of similarities, both within-category and between-category
correlations averaged 0.04. Because the possible collusion oc-
curred in only one task on this occasion, it had no effect on the
level of correlation between similarity matrices for the two differ-
ent tasks. (Recall that the tasks were done on different occasions.)
Results: Study 2B
Data cleaning. As in previous studies, a small number (less
than 1%) of ratings were left blank, and were replaced by the item
mean. The same two data cleaning analyses were run. Reliability
of the six typicality scales ranged from .88 to .96, and for the
importance scales from .91 to .97. On the basis of individual-group
correlations, one participant was excluded who had correlations of
less than 0.2 for four of the six categories for importance. The
analysis of high pairwise correlations showed no problems with
lack of independence in this sample, so no exclusions were needed
on that account. The final analysis was therefore based on 28
participants.
Analysis of Similarity. The last two columns of Table 3 show
that the replication produced very similar results. The background
positive correlation across categories was not significantly greater
4 The occurrence of possible collusion in Study 1 was not discovered
until after the running of Study 2. We had noted the unexpectedly high
correlation between the similarity matrices for different categories, but it
was only in the light of later studies that the source of the problem was
identified.
Table 2
Correlation in Study 1 Between Similarity Matrices for the First and Second Testing Session for Each Task and Correlation Between
the Similarity Matrices for Typicality and Importance Based on Ratings Aggregated Over Sessions
Typicality–typicality Importance–importance Typicality–importance
Within-category Between-category Within-category Between-category Within-category Between-category
Insects .39 .06 .18 .10 .20 .08
Sports .29 .00 .26 .08 .00 .07
Fish .27 .07 .40 .12 .08 .05
Tools .22 .01 .37 .17 .15 .15
Science .20 .03 .41 .16 .00 .09
Vegetables .28 .10 .34 .12 .02 .08
M (SD) .28 (.07) .04 (.13) .33 (.09) .13 (.11) .07 (.08) .09 (.10)
Note. Critical value of r(188) for  .05 is .143.
 p  .05.
Table 3
Within-Category and Between-Category Correlation of
Similarity Matrices for Typicality and Importance Tasks for
Studies 2A and 2B
Typicality–importance
Study 2A Study 2B
Within-
category
Between-
category
Within-
category
Between-
category
Insects .01 .02 .14 .03
Sports .10 .06 .08 .06
Fish .14 .05 .07 .03
Tools .13 .06 .13 .04
Science .07 .02 .01 .05
Vegetables .07 .04 .10 .03
M (SD) .05 (.10) .04 (.09) .07 (.08) .04 (.10)
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than zero for either task alone. The correlation between similarity
matrices for typicality and importance for this sample was actually
lower for within-category correlations (0.07) than for between-
category correlations (0.04). Furthermore, there was no evidence
of any systematic variation between the different categories.
Discussion
Across two studies and three samples, no evidence has been
found thus far to indicate any relation between the variety of ways
in which people judge exemplar typicality and the variety of ways
in which they judge feature importance. This failure cannot be
explained by low reliability, as in Study 1, not only were the scales
equally reliable, and the individual ratings reliably correlated
across occasions (showing that the tasks were undertaken consci-
entiously), but the similarity matrices for each category and for
each task across occasions were also significantly correlated above
the background level of correlation sometimes seen across differ-
ent categories.
Study 3
In Study 3, we aimed to consolidate the results obtained to date.
We returned to the design of Study 1, to confirm the systematic
individual variation within each task across testing occasions 2
weeks apart, and we also introduced some small variations in the
procedure. Some typicality items had several missing data points
in the previous studies because of low familiarity (watercress is not
commonly found in Sicily), and these items were removed. In
addition, other typicality items were removed so that both exem-
plar and feature lists contained just 12 items per category. As a
consequence, we dropped the strategy of excluding the top and
bottom anchor items from the analysis. For both tasks, all 12 items
were analyzed.
Another change was that instead of a rating from 1 to 7,
participants were asked to provide a ranking from 1 to 12 for each
list, so that similarity and difference between individuals simply in
their use of the rating scale would be eliminated. For example, if
some participants had given ratings across all categories with low
variance, then their correlation with all others would be lower,
owing to the effect of restricted variance on estimated correlation.
Hence, they would be consistently less similar to others across
both tasks (but also across categories). Using ranks, all participants
necessarily have the same variance for their judgments across a list
of 12 items.
Method
Participants. Thirty participants (26 females, 87%) aged be-
tween 19 and 32 years (mean age: 21.70; SD  3.63) were
recruited from the same population as the earlier studies. Six failed
to complete the second test, and so 24 remained in the study.
Materials. The same lists of features for the six categories
were used as previously for importance. For typicality, two items
were removed from each list as shown in Appendix A. The high
and low anchor items were no longer treated as fillers but were
included in the analysis.
Procedure. The procedure was similar to Study 1, except that
ranks rather than ratings were given. Furthermore this time we
rewrote the instructions of the two tasks. A possible reason for the
background level of positive correlations between similarity ma-
trices for different categories may lie in some ambiguity in the task
instructions. Participants may show similarity across categories
because of adopting the same particular interpretation of how to do
the task. In order to reduce this possibility, the instructions were
made more specific. In particular we asked participants to focus on
the interpretation of the scales most relevant to prototype and
exemplar theory. For typicality, participants were asked to judge
how similar an item was to other category members and how
representative it was. For importance, we asked participants to
judge the degree to which a feature was present in members of the
category and absent in its contrast categories. The revised instruc-
tions (translated here from the Italian) were as follows:
Typicality: In this booklet, you will find six category names,
and under each one a list of words. Please give us a judgment
of how representative or typical you think each word is of that
category. A typical example of a category is one that has a lot
in common with the other members of the category; it would
be a good example to represent what that category is normally
like. Decide which is the most typical and place a 1 against
that item. Then continue writing 2, 3, and so on, to order the
items in terms of their typicality down to 12 for the least
typical.
Importance: In this booklet, you will see six category names,
and under each name a list of features that describe things that
might be in that category. We want you to tell us how
important you think each feature is for deciding whether
something is in the category. An important feature is one that
you find often in members of the category—most members
have it, and that is also not so often found in other kinds of
thing. So it is distinctive to that category. Decide which is the
most important and place a 1 against that feature. Then
continue writing 2, 3, and so on, to order the items in terms
of their importance down to 12 for the least important.
As previously, both task instructions then included examples of
exemplars or features for the category of furniture.
Results
Data cleaning. There were no missing data to be replaced.
Reliability of the 12 typicality scales ranged from .907 to .980, and
for the 12 importance scales ranged from .800 to .948. One
participant had low correlations with the group on nine of the 24
scales and was excluded. A check for independence showed no
systematic pattern of pairs of participants with higher than ex-
pected correlations, so no further exclusions were needed. The
final analysis was therefore based on 23 participants.
Analysis of Similarity. Study 1 found that for both typicality
and importance, the correlation across 2 weeks for the same
individual was greater than the average correlation between indi-
viduals, thus supporting the hypothesis that there are systematic
individual differences in how people perform the tasks. The same
analysis was applied to the data from Study 3, and the results are
shown in Table 4.
As in Study 1, for typicality, the level of within-subject consis-
tency was greater (0.73, 95% CI [.63, .83]) than the level of
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between-subjects consensus (0.52, 95% CI [.37, .67]). The same
was true for importance (within-subject consistency of 0.57, 95%
CI [.45, .69] vs. between-subjects consensus of 0.32, 95% CI [.21,
.43]). This pattern was found in all categories. Note that the
increase in levels of correlation for typicality, compared to Study
1, can be explained by the inclusion in the analysis this time of the
high and low anchor items, on which almost everyone agreed. The
levels seen here are close to those reported by Barsalou (1987) for
typicality ratings of .8 for consistency and .6 for consensus.
We next analyzed the stability of the similarity structure across
individuals for each task, by correlating the similarity matrices for
each task across occasions. As previously, correlations within
categories were compared with correlations across different cate-
gories as a control for general response factors. The results are
shown in the columns of Table 5 for the typicality task across
occasions (typicality–typicality) and for the importance task across
occasions (importance–importance).
The similarity structure proved reliable across occasions for
both typicality (r  .44 within categories vs. .10 between catego-
ries), t(34)  7.45, p  .001, and importance (r  .33 within and
.04 between), t(34)  6.78, p  .001. The similarity structure for
each task was therefore reliably repeated on the second occasion.
The final columns of Table 5 (“Typicality–importance”) then show
the critical correlation between similarities on one task (averaged
across occasions) and similarities on the other task. Although the
correlation between the similarity matrices across tasks for the
same category (.15) was positive and greater than that for different
categories (.05), this difference was not significant on an indepen-
dent t test applied to the Fisher Z-transformed correlations, t(34) 
1.87, p  .07. Four of the six categories showed a positive
difference, and two a negative difference. While insects, tools and
vegetables showed a positive effect, the other three categories
showed none.
Proximity analysis. As an additional check on the data and
the method of analysis used, SPSS-Proxscal was used to compute
proximities between participants for each task and for each cate-
gory in two dimensional spaces. (multidimensional scaling aims to
remove noise in the data by constraining similarities to map onto
proximity in a space.) Proximities for the two tasks within the
same category correlated on average at 0.11 (SD  .12 across the
six categories). Across different categories, the same two measures
correlated on average at 0.04 (SD  .10). This difference again
failed to reach significance, t(34)  1.47, p  .15. In contrast,
comparing proximities for typicality judgments between the first
and second test, correlations across the six categories averaged
0.32 within the same category and only .11 between different
categories, while the same analysis for importance judgments gave
average correlations of .27 within and .07 between. Both differ-
ences were significant on a t test, p  .005. A second method of
analysis using proximities therefore confirmed the conclusions
drawn from our previous analysis method.
Discussion
There were few differences in results when rankings were used
rather than ratings. Once again the results supported the conclusion
of no connection between the similarity in how individuals judge
exemplar typicality and the similarity in how they judge feature
importance. Both tasks showed a strong difference between
within-subject consistency and between-subjects consensus at the
level of simple correlations. Looking at the similarity matrices for
each task, there were stable differences over time in how similar
participants were to each other on both tasks considered separately.
But the similarity structure for one task did not significantly map
onto that for the other. Unlike the earlier studies there were some
small signs of a positive effect, particularly for three of the six
categories, but it was not of sufficient strength to justify rejecting
Table 4
Correlations Across Occasions Within Participants and Average
Correlation Between Participants Within an Occasion for
Study 3
Typicality Importance
Category
Within-
subject
consistency
Between-
subject
consensus
Within-
subject
consistency
Between-
subject
consensus
Insects .66 (.32) .52 (.28) .51 (.27) .16 (.33)
Sports .82 (.15) .70 (.18) .70 (.17) .45 (.25)
Fish .70 (.31) .34 (.29) .59 (.20) .29 (.31)
Tools .77 (.12) .59 (.21) .38 (.40) .26 (.31)
Science .65 (.22) .37 (.30) .56 (.27) .36 (.25)
Vegetables .79 (.15) .64 (.23) .65 (.19) .41 (.28)
M (SD) .73 (.23) .52 (.25) .57 (.26) .32 (.29)
Table 5
Correlation in Study 3 Between Similarity Matrices for the First and Second Testing Session for Each Task (Typicality–Typicality and
Importance–Importance) and Correlation Between the Similarity Matrices for Typicality and Importance Based on Ratings
Aggregated Over Sessions
Typicality–typicality Importance–importance Typicality–importance
Within-category Between-category Within-category Between-category Within-category Between-category
Insects .30 .11 .25 .11 .28 .08
Sports .43 .02 .36 .03 .03 .08
Fish .47 .12 .48 .01 .04 .02
Tools .51 .13 .32 .07 .30 .06
Science .42 .12 .25 .04 .07 .01
Vegetables .51  .14 .34 .02 .27 .05
M (SD) .44 (.08) .10 (.11) .33 (.09) .05 (.10) .15 (.15) .05 (.11)
 p  .05.
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the null hypothesis for which the earlier studies had provided
ample evidence. (The likelihood under the null hypothesis of at
least one of the four analyses reaching the observed p level of .07
is [1  .934]  .25.)
Note also that (a) of the three categories for which an effect was
observed only one (insects) showed any similar effect in Study 1,
(b) the three categories of insects, tools and vegetables do not
represent any theoretically interesting subset in terms of their
ontological status, and (c) there was no correspondence in the
effect sizes seen for the six categories across studies (mean r 
.07; e.g., insects was positive in Study 3 but showed a negative
effect in both Studies 2A and 2B).
Analysis of Exemplar by Feature Matrices
The interpretation of the results from Studies 1 through 3
depends crucially on the assumption that the features we selected
for each category were those involved in determining typicality
differences among exemplars in the category as a whole. To test
this assumption, we used the exemplar by feature applicability
matrices generated by Verheyen and Storms (2013) and De Deyne
et al. (2008). These matrices provide normative judgments of the
degree to which each feature of a concept is true of each exem-
plar—for example, within the category of bird, whether “flies” is
true of “robin.” In their study, five participants completed matrices
containing 24 exemplars sampled from each category and its near
neighbors and between 29 and 39 features. Each person judged yes
or no whether each feature applied to each exemplar, and the
applicability score for each exemplar/feature combination was the
number (out of 5) who responded yes. By summing these scores
across a set of features, a feature score can be calculated for each
exemplar representing its featural similarity to the category proto-
type. We correlated these feature scores with exemplar typicality
in a number of different ways (see Table 6).
The first two columns of Table 6 compare the 12 features used
in Studies 1–3 (second column) with the full set of features to be
found in the norms (first column). Feature scores for these two sets
were compared in their ability to predict typicality in the category,
as evidenced by their correlation with the rated typicality of the 24
exemplars listed in the norms for each category. In every case, the
level of correlation was comparable, with the mean levels being
.82 for all features and .80 for our selection of 12 features. The
selection of 12 features was therefore representative of the full set
of features in this important regard. The third and fourth columns
in the Table show the effect of reducing the set of exemplars
considered to just the 12 exemplars in Study 3 (which included top
and bottom anchors) and the 12 used in Studies 1 and 2 (where
anchors were removed). As would be expected from the restricted
variance and smaller sample size, the correlations are somewhat
lower overall and become much more variable, ranging from
around .15 to .90 across categories. To understand the lower
correlations, consider science where for Study 1 all the exemplars
fell within the narrow typicality range of 4.6 (archaeology) to 6.6
(astronomy) on a 7-point scale. Hence, the correlation of the 12
features with the list of 12 exemplars was only .19, whereas for the
24 exemplars, with twice the standard deviation for typicality, the
correlation was .80.
To conclude, the sample of features used in the three studies has
been shown to be representative of the general set of features that
people use to describe the concepts. In some cases, the 12 features
in our sample did not predict typicality differences in the 12
exemplars in our sample. However, they all predicted typicality
across a wider sample, and that is the key evidence that is needed
to show that they were representative of the features involved in
the concept prototype.
Study 4
As a final test of our hypothesis, we report an unpublished study
conducted by the first author some years ago (around 1985) using
a different set of categories and materials, and with some other
important differences. It is reported here, because although not
conducted as part of the current project, the differences in method
and content lend a useful test of generality to the results reported
so far. The study was conducted on a different sample of students
and in English rather than Italian. It also used 10 categories, only
four of which were used in Studies 1–3. Most importantly the
Table 6
Comparison of the Correlation of Feature Score With Typicality for the Sample of 12 Features
Used in Studies 1–3 and for the Full Set of Norms
Correlation of feature score with typicality
All features 
24 exemplars
from norms
12 Features 
24 exemplars
from norms
12 Features 
12 exemplars
from Study 3
12 Features  12
exemplars from
Studies 1 and 2
Insects .84 .83 .70 .37
Sports .88 .80 .92 .72
Fish .80 .77 .77 .90
Tools .84 .94 .89 .80
Science .84 .80 .65 .19
Vegetables .72 .63 .15 .14
M .82 .80 .68 .52
Note. Four analyses are shown, correlating respectively: (a) feature scores based on all the 29 to 39 features
in the norms with the typicality of all 24 exemplars in the norms, (b) feature scores based on the selected 12
features with the typicality of all 24 exemplars in the norms, (c) feature scores based on the 12 selected features
with reverse ranked typicality of the 12 exemplars used in Study 3, and (d) feature scores based on the 12
selected features with rated typicality of the 12 exemplars in Studies 1 and 2.
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instructions for both tasks emphasized not only typicality judg-
ments but also the degree of category membership shown.
Method
Participants. Twenty-five students (both males and females)
at City University London participated on a voluntary basis.
Materials. Ten categories were used (see Appendix B), in-
cluding four of those used in Studies 1–3. For each category, a list
of 10 features and a list of 20 exemplars were used. The list of
exemplars included a number of borderline cases and some non-
members.
Procedure. The first section of the experimental booklet con-
tained instructions for ranking the importance of the features of
each category, including the following:
Your task will be to judge which is the most important feature in
deciding whether any object is a representative member of the cate-
gory or not. For example, all birds have feathers, and no other
creatures do, so this you might consider the most important. Alterna-
tively, you might consider flying most important as it distinguishes
typical birds from the less typical ones.
The numbers 1–10 were used to rank importance of the list of 10
features for each of the 10 categories. In Section 2 of the booklet,
instructions asked participants
to decide the extent to which each word does or does not belong to the
category. First, decide whether the word belongs to the category, then
if it does, decide how typical a member it is, and if it does not, decide
how closely related to the category it is.
These instructions follow Hampton (1979) as a means of com-
bining category membership and typicality into a single scale of
graded membership.
Judgments of typicality were recorded using an analogue scale.
Opposite each exemplar was printed a solid horizontal line 8 cm
long. The left end was labeled unrelated, and the right end highly
typical, while the midpoint was marked and labeled boundary. The
instructions continued,
The three marks already on the line represent (from the left): the
completely unrelated end of the scale; the category boundary at which
it is impossible to decide if the answer is yes or no; and the completely
prototypical category member end of the scale. Please read the whole
list first to get a feel for the range of items and then work down the
list carefully making a mark against each word. If you do not know the
meaning of any of the words, please indicate this.
The data were then scored using a ruler to create a rank order for
the typicality/membership of the exemplars for each participant.
For both feature importance and typicality, an example of birds
was used to illustrate the method.
Results
Six data points were missing because participants did not know
the item and were replaced with the average rank. Reliability of the
scales was high for all 20 scales, (mean .94 for importance, .96 for
typicality), and no participants needed to be excluded for consis-
tently low correlations with the group. The distribution of corre-
lations was similar to the previous studies (see Figure 1) with a
negative skew. There was no evidence of pairs of participants with
consistently high correlations across categories.
Similarities between participants on each of the 20 scales were
computed as before using correlation matrices. The average cor-
relation within a scale (indicating the degree of consensus in the
group) was .45 for importance and .53 for typicality, with all scales
showing mean values significantly above zero, t(299)  10.0, p 
.001 (see Table 7).
These similarity matrices were then correlated to test the pre-
diction of a correspondence between interperson similarities on
each of the two tasks. The correlation between the similarity
matrices for importance and typicality within-categories is shown
in the right column of Table 7. The mean was very close to zero
(M  0.007). (There were two correlations that differed signif-
icantly from zero, but one was positive and the other negative.)
Between different categories, the correlation of importance and
typicality (not shown in the Table) was 0.023.
Discussion
In terms of materials and procedure, Study 4 differed from the
previous studies in numerous ways, but the results were directly
comparable, both in the level of consensus on each task and in the
lack of correspondence between similarity matrices. The language
used was English rather than Italian and the participants were from
a large metropolitan city rather than a small provincial one. Six
additional categories were used, and with a different selection of
features and exemplars for the four that were repeated. Exemplar
lists included borderline and nonmembers of the categories. The
procedure used just 10 features to be ranked, and 20 exemplars
whose ranking was derived from an analogue scale. Most impor-
tantly the instructions for each task made explicit reference to the
other. Thus, when ranking importance, people were told to think
about what would make an exemplar both a clear member and a
highly typical category member, and when judging typicality, they
considered both category membership and typicality at the same
time. There was therefore good reason to suppose that there would
be a strong link between the two tasks. The results, however, very
clearly supported the previous findings of a near zero correlation
between interindividual similarities on the two tasks. The fact that
many differences in materials and procedure led to the same result
Table 7
Results of Study 4 Showing Significant Consensus on Each Task
and Zero Correlation Between Similarities Across Tasks
Consensus Correlation of similarities
for importance and
typicalityCategory Importance Typicality
Sports .49 .43 .04
Fish .68 .47 .18
Tools .46 .55 .04
Vegetables .57 .58 .00
Furniture .33 .50 .16
Vehicles .38 .58 .01
Weapons .57 .44 .09
Clothing .40 .62 .09
Kitchen utensils .39 .42 .05
Fruit .23 .73 .08
M (SD) .45 (.13) .53 (.10) .01 (.10)
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lends weight to the conclusion that there is a genuine lack of
relation between the two tasks that requires a theoretical explana-
tion.
General Discussion
Across four studies with five samples of participants a common
conclusion was reached. Judgments of exemplar typicality and of
feature importance were made reliably by most participants. Group
consensus and test-retest consistency were both substantial indi-
cating that the tasks were tapping a common understanding of
concepts. Both tasks also showed a greater degree of correlation
within individuals than between individuals, supporting the idea
that there are consistent individual differences in representation.
This study is the first to confirm that this pattern, previously
reported for typicality and other measures of conceptual structure
is also to be found for judgments of feature importance.
The present research took the analysis a step further by asking
whether the similarity between people in the sample could be
shown to form a stable structure. Studies 1 and 3 confirmed that
the matrix of pairwise similarities between individuals was stable
over time for both the typicality and the importance tasks. Yet in
none of the five samples was there any significant evidence that
the similarity structure for typicality judgments could be mapped
onto that for importance. Studies 1, 2A, 2B, and 4 found the
relationship to be close to zero, once the level of general positive
correlation seen between the matrices for different categories was
taken into account. Study 3 obtained a small trend in the right
direction, but the correlation was not significantly greater than the
background level of correlation, in spite of the stable similarity
differences shown for each task. Studies 1, 3, and 4 even had the
two tasks performed on the same occasion one after the other. This
procedure might be expected to prime a relation between the two
tasks. Having rated hiking as a typical sport and darts as atypical,
one might expect the participant to go on to judge physical fitness
as a more important feature of sports than specific skill. (Recall
that Verheyen & Storms, 2013, identified reliable group differ-
ences in their sample in how darts vs. hiking were categorized.)
But there was still no connection seen between the two tasks in
terms of participant similarities.
Because we were comparing similarities across tasks, care was
needed to ensure that artifactual effects were excluded. If a par-
ticipant found both tasks hard to follow, then their similarity to
others would be low on both tasks, and hence contribute to a
positive correlation between similarity matrices. To this end, we
used the fact of a participant having a low set of correlations with
the group mean across different categories as an exclusion crite-
rion. At the other end of the scale, we excluded five participants in
Study 1 and one in Study 2A who had an unusually high number
of very high correlations with other participants. A pair of partic-
ipants who were artificially similar on both tasks would clearly
contribute to an apparent match across the tasks. In the end, this
exclusion had no effect on the conclusions that were drawn,
because we were able to introduce a control that took account of
individual differences on factors other than differences in repre-
sentation. By comparing the correlation of the similarity matrices
between tasks for the same category with that for different cate-
gories, any systematic individual similarities introduced by differ-
ences in motivation, or differences in interpretation of instructions
could be controlled for. Similarities based on motivation or inter-
pretation of the task would show up equally in the correlations
between different categories as within the same category.
One question that arises is whether the similarity structure seen
in each task separately was sufficiently strong for the correlation
between them to emerge. When the data from the two testing
occasions were combined, the Spearman-Brown reliability of the
two similarity matrices averaged .43 and .49 for typicality and
importance in Study 1 and .61 and .49, respectively, for Study 3.
These are relatively high values for reliability, and given that there
were six to 10 categories and five samples, there was ample
opportunity for even a small effect to appear. Interestingly, if one
correlates the size of the correlation between typicality and impor-
tance similarity matrices with the joint reliability of the two
measures, there was a negative correlation across categories
of .29 for Study 1 and .39 for Study 3. Thus when the two
similarity measures were more reliable, their intercorrelation was
actually lower.
Meta Power Analysis
In making a strong claim for the absence of an effect, it is useful
to provide some statistical support from a consideration of power.
The results of the four critical t tests from Studies 1 through 3,
comparing the correlations of similarity matrices between the two
tasks for within-category versus between-category comparisons
were used in a meta-analysis to estimate the power of detecting a
difference in the predicted direction. We took the level of between-
category correlation as given in each case, and estimated the power
to detect an increase in the within-category correlation above that
level. To find a difference in mean correlations of as great as 0.10
(as seen in Study 3), each study had a power independently to
detect such a difference of between .55 and .76. The estimated
likelihood of a Type II error in each sample was therefore between
.45 and .24, and multiplying these together, the likelihood of
obtaining a Type II error in each of the four samples was estimated
to be 0.008. In other words, the power to detect a significant result
of this magnitude, with   .05, in at least one of our four samples
was greater than 99%. In fact the set of studies had a combined
power of 90% to detect an increase in the correlation for within-
category comparisons of as little as 0.07 in at least one of the
samples. Our observed effect size based on a weighted mean
across studies was actually 0.007 with SE  .046.
If, to these calculations, the null result of Study 4 is added,
where the power to detect a mean correlation of .10 across the 10
categories was estimated at 90%, the likelihood of there being a
theoretically interesting level of correlation between the two sim-
ilarities, using our methods, is vanishingly small.
Sources of Individual Variation
A positive result from these studies was the evidence for stable
levels of individual difference in concept representation as seen
both in extensional and intensional measures. Differences between
individuals in performing these tasks may be related to various
aspects of their knowledge. In fact, Connell and Lynott (2014)
argue that every time a concept is instantiated in memory it will
have a different representation. First, it is possible that people
represent the conceptual categories differently. For example, Ver-
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heyen and Storms (2013) have shown that sports may be more
about physical effort for some people, and more skill-based for
others. Second, knowledge and views of the individual exemplars
being judged for typicality may also vary. Some people may be
very familiar with a particular sport and so rate it highly, while
others may know little about it. Third, there may be differences in
how people understand the features being rated for importance, or
in their beliefs about which exemplars possess them. Any of these
three sources of variation would give rise to individual differences
in concept representation. The conundrum is to understand why
there is a disconnect between the individual differences and sim-
ilarities that are seen in extensional and intensional behavioral
measures.
It is important to understand that the evidence presented here is
indirect, being based on the (lack of) correspondence between
similarity structures among individuals, rather than a direct mea-
sure of each individual’s links between exemplars and features.
Judgments of typicality and importance each no doubt have mul-
tiple influences, some of which will be specific to one or other task
and may lead to a reduction in the correlation between similarity
structures. However a central assumption of concept theories—that
intensions determine extensions—predicts that there will be at
least some, possibly low, but significant level of correlation, and
this is what has failed to appear. Suppose two individuals are both
keen runners, but have no interest in archery. The assumption is
that their ideas about the features which are important for counting
something as a typical sport will be similar as a consequence.
Personal learning histories and individual interests should have an
influence in both tasks. Intuitions of typicality should be based on
what features are considered important and whether the exemplar
possesses them, while intuitions of which features are important
should be based on the exemplars that a person brings to mind as
being typical.
It is also likely that some of the similarity between individuals’
typicality judgments in our data was driven by features that hap-
pened to be excluded from our sample. However, given random
sampling of features across multiple categories, and given that the
features chosen proved to be just as predictive of typicality as
those not selected, it is highly improbable that the results could just
be explained by inadequate sampling. The replication of the null
result with a new sample of categories and features in Study 4
supports this claim.
Implications for Theories of Concepts
These results present a serious challenge to a number of theories
of concept representation. The most seriously affected theory is the
prototype theory, according to which an exemplar’s typicality
depends on its possession of important features, and a feature’s
importance depends on its association with typical exemplars
(Hampton, 2006). However, even theories of concepts that deny
the role of prototypes as concepts still assume that most common
concepts have prototypes (Connolly, Fodor, Gleitman, & Gleit-
man, 2007). According to most accounts of prototypes and typi-
cality effects, judgments of typicality and judgments of which
features are important for categorization should rely on a single
semantic representation. It is therefore difficult to explain the lack
of relation between the stable individual differences in intensional
and extensional task performance.
As discussed in the introduction, there is plenty of evidence to
point to the close connection between exemplar typicality and
shared features. Barsalou (1985) found a partial correlation be-
tween ratings of central tendency (i.e., similarity to category mem-
bers) and goodness of example (or typicality) of .71, substantially
above other predictors. Consequently almost all accounts of typi-
cality differences within categories make reference to similarity
among exemplars (see, e.g., Zee et al., 2014), and most accounts of
similarity among rich concepts such as these make reference to
shared and distinctive features (Tversky, 1977). Had our results
come out with the expected match of similarities, it would have
clearly been strong support for this general account of typicality
effects. The failure to do so must therefore be of considerable
interest to supporters and critics of prototype theory alike.
One explanation of our results that can be ruled out is to argue
that people have no metacognitive access to information about
features and their role in concept representations. For example,
some exemplar models (e.g., Hintzman, 1986) would suggest that
features are equally weighted, and so there would be no basis for
making such a judgment. In a similar vein, studies in social
psychology have often found that people’s justification and expla-
nation of their actions are often dissociated from their actual
reasons for acting (Nisbett & Wilson, 1977; Johansson, Hall,
Sikström, & Olsson, 2005; Johansson, Hall, Sikström, Tärning, &
Lind 2006). Against this view, we found that (a) the degree of
reliability (alpha) for feature importance judgments in Study 1 was
just as high as for typicality judgments, (b) the consistency and
consensus levels were comparable, and (c) the stability of the
similarity matrices were also equivalent. (In Study 3, values for
typicality were relatively enhanced because of the inclusion of the
anchor items.) It cannot therefore be argued that the importance
task was not tapping a valid and reliable source of semantic
information. If there was simply a lack of metacognitive access to
intensional information, then one cannot explain why intensional
judgments should be reliable, and why the similarity structure for
intensions should be stable across occasions. Yet it appears that at
the level of individual differences the information involved in
intensional judgments is disconnected from that involved in typi-
cality judgments. People with more similar views about which
features are more important are not more similar in their views
about which exemplars are more typical.
The lack of a relationship between the similarity structures for
the extensional and intensional tasks strongly suggests that the
aspects of semantic memory tapped by the two tasks are indepen-
dent of each other. This conclusion lends support to so-called
hybrid theories of concepts in which there are multiple represen-
tations of the same concept within the mind. In philosophy, a
number of authors have proposed that exemplars, prototypes and
theories may exist independently in semantic memory. Machery
(2009) is the foremost proponent of this view. He argues that
“concept” is a theoretically empty term, and that cognitive science
will need to replace it with theories that individuate the exemplar,
prototype and theory aspects of conceptual representations. Further
discussions of pluralism for concepts can be found in Dove (2009),
Rice (2015), and Weiskopf (2009).
If we accept Machery’s (2009) proposal, then extensional judg-
ments about typicality and graded membership could be based on
a memory store of exemplars, structured by similarity. As de-
scribed in the introduction, Storms (2004) describes evidence that
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superordinate concepts like tool may be represented as a collection
of basic level concepts, such as hammer, saw, and chisel, so that
typicality in the superordinate category reflects similarity to the
closest basic level concept, rather than similarity to the prototype
features of the superordinate itself. Individual variation in exten-
sional judgments would then reflect which exemplars are promi-
nently stored in a person’s semantic memory, and which dimen-
sions of similarity are used to structure the store. On the other
hand, intensional judgments about the importance of a feature
would rely on the “theory” aspect of concept representation, re-
flecting a higher more abstract level of thinking. For example,
Sloman, Love, and Ahn (1998) measured the importance of a
feature for a category by asking people to estimate the likelihood
that an item which lacked that feature could belong in the category.
Importance may therefore depend on understanding of how fea-
tures are interrelated with causal and functional connections at the
category level (e.g., that a bird without wings would not fly), and
so similarity in task performance would reflect the degree of
shared beliefs about the network of causal relations among the
concepts features.
In sum, a possible explanation of our result combines an
exemplar-based account of extensions with a causal schema based
account of intensions. Such a hybrid model lacks the coherence
and simplicity of prototype theory, but the evidence presented here
is inconsistent with the latter model. It can be noted that there is
also evidence for two systems of category learning in the related
field of perceptual categorization (Ashby, Alfonso-Reese, Turken,
& Waldron, 1998; for a review, see Wills, 2013). Ashby et al.’s
(1998) competition between verbal and implicit systems (i.e.,
COVIS) model proposed that there is an implicit exemplar-based
categorization learning system and an explicit rule-based learning
system. Because rules are clearly intensional, referring to features
of the stimuli, there may be a parallel with the dissociation that we
have discovered with concepts in long-term semantic memory.
Another parallel is with the “two systems” theory of reasoning
(Evans, 2010; Kahneman, 2012; Sloman, 1996), where one could
see extensional decisions as using fast heuristic methods and
intensional decisions as requiring more deliberate processing (see
also Hampton, 1984). Such parallels remain speculative.
Conclusions
This article presents the first detailed exploration of the consis-
tency and degree of consensus in people’s judgments about the
importance of different features in the makeup of a concept pro-
totype. We found that these importance judgments can be just as
reliable as the more commonly studied typicality judgments. Just
as with typicality judgments and category membership judgments,
importance judgments showed individual consistency over time
that was greater than the level of between-individual consensus. In
addition, the similarity matrices showing the similarity of one
individual’s judgments to another also showed stability over time
for both extensional and intensional judgments. Both typicality and
importance judgments reveal stable individual variation in concept
representation. However the similarity structure for one task (typ-
icality) did not map onto that for the other (importance), suggest-
ing that concepts’ intensions and extensions are not represented in
a single integrated form, but may result from a pluralistic or hybrid
form of concept representation.
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Appendix A
Table A1
Feature Lists for the Importance Judgments for Studies 1–3
Insect Sport Fish
Is more often encountered during summer Can be practiced in competition Has fins
Flies or crawls Has some rules of play Swims in aquariums
Is eaten by other animals Supporters encourage the players Doesn’t live on land
Doesn’t live long Requires concentration/mental effort Can swim
Often bites Is practiced in a club Has eyes
Lays eggs Requires specific skills Breathes through gills
Carries diseases Is good for one’s fitness Can have different colors
Has six legs Is healthy Is tasty
Is irritating Requires special clothing Is healthy
Lives in colonies Is practiced outdoors Is slippery
Is vermin Produces sweat Is sometimes eaten by man
There are lots of these Is tiring Lays eggs
Tool Science Vegetable
Is primarily used by men (not women) Has brought modern comfort Grows in the ground
Was used in early ages Allows one to make predictions Is nutritious
Made of wood Is interesting Comes in different colors
Used in construction People expect a lot from it Exists in different kinds
Is meant for people who are handy Is responsible for longer life expectancy Is boiled
Is big Explains all kinds of phenomena Can be eaten raw
Makes work easier Is based on empirical data Can have different tastes
Can be dangerous Is pursued at universities Is eaten warm
Is held in the hand Provides insight into common things Contains vitamins
Is used to work with Is held in high regard Is not sweet
Is an aid One should be critical of it Grows in the garden
Comes in very handy/useful Is boring Green color
Table A2
Exemplar Lists Used for Typicality Judgments for Studies 1–3
Insects Sports Fish Tools Science Vegetables
Amoebac Aerobicsc Alligatorc Axe Advertisingb Apple
Bacterium Ballroom Dancing Catfish Calculatorc Archaeology Artichoke
Caterpillar Billiards Clam Dictionary Architecture Breadb
Centipede Bullfighting Eel Hammera Astrology Cereal
Dust Mite Chess Jellyfish Key Astronomy Chili Pepper
Earthworm Conversationb Oysterc Pen Chemistry Garlic
Hamsterb Croquetc Plankton Photographb Dentistryc Parsley
Head Lice Darts Sardine Scalpelc Economics Pineapplec
Leech Hiking Seagullb Scissors Geometry Potato
Mosquitoa Jogging Shark Screw Mathematics Sage
Scorpion Kite Flying Shrimp Sewing Needle Medicinea Seaweed
Silkworm Surfing Tadpole Stone Pharmacy Spinacha
Snail Swimminga Trouta Umbrella Psychologyc Turnip
Termitec Wrestling Whale Varnish Sociology Watercressc
a Item treated as high typicality anchor filler in Studies 1 and 2. b Item treated as low typicality anchor filler in Studies 1 and 2. c Items omitted in Study
3 to reduce the list length to 12.
(Appndices continue)
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Appendix B
Table B1
Feature Lists Used for Study 4
Sports Fish Tools Vegetables Furniture
Involve skill Have tails Have handles Are always cooked Is made of wood
Involve spectators Are catchable Are used in industry Are grown commercially Is moveable
Have rules Have fins Are hard Grow close to the ground Is found in the home
Are competitive Swim Are for constructing things Are green Is for keeping things in
Have teams Have gills Are hand-held,
manipulable
Are eaten with meat Is functional
Involve physical exertion Cannot survive on land Are sharp Are the roots of plants Has legs
Are done for exercise Are slimy Have a specialized
function
Have leaves and stalks Is for sitting on
Are enjoyable to do Have eyes Are made of metal Are not sweet Is decorative
Involve special equipment Have scales Are strong Are tasty Is expensive
Take place out of doors Are edible Are used to repair things Are crunchy when raw Is comfortable
Vehicles Weapons Clothing Kitchen utensils Fruit
Made of metal Are used to injure people Is for protection against
the weather
Made of metal in part Contains seeds
Have wheels Are made of metal Is soft Held in the hand Is juicy
Carry people Have a sharp edge Is for preserving one’s
modesty
Made of plastic in part Is soft
Are steered Are used in wars Gives an impression of
one’s character
Have handles Is eaten raw
Have seats Are explosive Is worn on the body Used for cooking with Is healthy for you to eat
Carry things Are used to destroy things Is made of woven material Made of wood in part Has a peel
Have an engine Are used to hurt people Is pliable Have a sharp edge Grows on trees
Are expensive Have restricted availability Provides fashion Are containers Is colorful
Move faster than a man
on his own Shoot some projectile Is attractive Are heat resistant Is sweet
Have a driver Are dangerous Is long-lasting Are only found in kitchens Is round
(Appndices continue)
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Table B2
Exemplar Lists Used for Study 4
Sports Fish Tools Vegetables Furniture
Dueling Whale Excavator Carrot Transistor radio
Swimming Cod Saw Mushroom Card table
Croquet Octopus Plumb line Rice Wastepaper basket
Deep-sea diving Otter Clothes iron Turnip Ashtray
Football Squid Cooker Olive Chair
Skipping Tadpole Spirit level Gourd Fridge
Writing Jellyfish Typewriter Avocado Mirror
Billiards Clam Shovel Garlic Telephone
Sack race Dolphin Potato peeler Rhubarb Curtains
Roller skating Eel Potter’s wheel Tomato Cushion
Bar-football Oyster Ruler Celery Picture
Fishing Seahorse Paint brush Dandelion Television
Roulette Starfish Pencil Seaweed Clock
Fox-hunting Stingray Mug Cucumber Cupboard
Chess Lobster Pocket calculator Asparagus Wall-shelf
Horse riding Shark Cigarette lighter Potato Bed
Darts Shrimp Blow torch Sweetcorn Mantelpiece
Archery Crab Suitcase Radish Hi-fi set
Surfing Plaice Scalpel Beetroot Carpet
Pot-holing Walrus Clothes brush Ginger Car seat
Vehicles Weapons Clothing Kitchen utensils Fruit
Surfboard Gas Wallet Strainer Orange
Bus Knife Shirt Fork Rhubarb
Pram Stick Wristwatch Dishwasher Sweet potato
Parachute Words Briefcase Meat thermometer Watermelon
Pavement Gun Dress Knife Carrot
Conveyor belt Foot Band-Aid Radio Pumpkin
Lawnmower Scissors Fingernail varnish Sponge Beetroot
Canoe Poison Umbrella Sink Walnut
Taxi Rope Shoes Clock Olive
Roller skates Brick Hearing aid Table Pomegranate
Feet Car Necklace Scissors Coconut
Wheelchair Fist Makeup Electric blender Apple
Bicycle Glass Bracelet Corkscrew Raisin
Wheelbarrow Ice pick Handkerchief Gas cooker Mango
Horse Axe Cufflinks Plate Fig
Train Cannon Buttons Broom Tomato
Cable car Razor blade Dentures Fridge Cucumber
Lift Stone Handbag Toaster Gherkin
Merry-go-round Laser beam Top hat Mop Lemon
Submarine Nuclear bomb Gloves Glass Peanut
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